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MORS ORAL HISTORY
INTERVIEW WITH Mr. Brian McEnany, FS
Fairfax, VA
MR. BILL DUNN, FS AND DR. BOB
SHELDON, FS, INTERVIEWERS
BOB SHELDON:We’re here for an oral
history interview with Brian McEnany.
Let’s start with your parents’ names, and
tell us how they influenced you.
BRIAN MCENANY: My mother was
Marie Love and she was British. She was
next to the youngest of seven children
of Joseph Love, a sea-faring engineer, and
Clara Atkinson Love. Marie came to the
United States to live with her oldest sister
near Vails Gate, NY, when she was four-
teen years old. She met my father, Francis
Raymond McEnany, in Newburgh, New
York. He was the third son of Robert and
Sarah (Sadie) McEnany of Newburgh, NY.
My dad joined the Army, a local Na-
tional Guard unit, in the 1930s. When I
was born in 1940, he had just completed
Officer Candidate School (OCS).
Most of my growing up centered on be-
ing shunted from place to place, sometimes
on Army bases, sometimes apartments, and
what not. For the better part of five years
during World War II, we moved around
the country.
I probably went through every state in
the union by the time I was twelve years
old. Alaska and Hawaii were not in the
union at that time. (Laughter) I think because
my dad was in the service I became inter-
ested in the military, not necessarily on the
analytic side; that came later.
BOB SHELDON:What was your dad’s
Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)?
BRIANMCENANY:He was in the artil-
lery. He spent about twenty-eight years in
the service and retired in 1960 during my
second year at West Point.
BOBSHELDON:Where was he during
World War II?
BRIAN MCENANY: He was in the Eu-
ropean theater, but he was stationed here in
the States until 1944. If you go back and read
the history, the plan was to have a hundred
divisions to ship overseas. He was part of
one of the later-deploying National Guard
divisions. It was either the 42nd or the 47th
division from the Northeast. He took part
in the Louisiana Maneuvers. Then he was
shifted to Washington State while the di-
vision was based there on the coast, a
part of the North Western Defense Com-
mand. He was finally able to have us join
him and we lived in a house in Olympia,
Washington, outside of Seattle. He was part
of an artillery battalion that put in the sur-
vey locations for coast artillery down the
West Coast. When you cross the Golden
Gate Bridge going north, one of his posi-
tions is still visible on the coast line. After
Olympia, we moved to Santa Barbara,
California, for sector defense duty. He told
me one time that he camped on the golf
course in the middle of Los Angeles at one
point.
My mother and I traveled back and
forth across country. I remember traveling
either by train or by convoy of automobiles
with a group of wives at least twice back
and forth across the States during that pe-
riod of time. Dad did not deploy to England
until the latter part of 1944.
He was on the ground right behind Pat-
ton’s 3rd Army. Dad’s first combat was at
the Remagen bridgehead when the 3rd
Army pushed across the Rhine River into
Germany.
BOB SHELDON: Did he talk much
about his war experiences?
BRIANMCENANY:Not a lot. That was
one of the shortcomings that I found out try-
ing to write down a family history later in
life. You have to talk to your parents about
who their grandparents were. After they
passed away, I ended up with a box full of
pictures and I have no idea who they are. I
knew who my grandmother was, or at least
I thought I did, until I found out she was
a step-grandmother (Laughter) – at the ap-
propriate time.
Grandma ‘‘Mac’’ was actually the sec-
ond wife of my grandfather. I never knew
my real grandparents; both of my father’s
parents passed away before I was born. I
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remember talking to my grandfather once on
the telephone when I was seven or eight.
BILL DUNN: Where did you go to junior
high and high school?
BRIANMCENANY: No junior high. I must
have changed schools around 10 or 12 times be-
fore I reached high school. By then, I had trav-
eled across the States twice by car or train as
we moved frequently, trying to keep up with
my father. I was able to get a decent math back-
ground in the process, but my English grammar
was very slim. I still have to write and re-write
a lot to make it right. I attended kindergarten
twice. I failed it once as my family often reminds
me–I was too young for public kindergarten and
had to start over again. Then, I went to schools
in Oklahoma as well as New York in Newburgh
and New Windsor. After Dad came back from
the war, my brother was born in 1946. Dad
was de-mobilized and tried several times to
get back into the Army. Washington finally of-
fered him a deal - you can come back in but
we are sending you to Alaska. There was no
dependent housing in the late 1940s. He was
stationed near Fairbanks and then at Adak
in the Aleutian Islands. After he returned
from his three-year tour in the cold, he was
assigned to Fort Knox, and then the Korean
War broke out. Dad went to Korea in 1950 and
six months later was in the Pusan perimeter.
General McArthur asked for volunteers to help
build the new Japanese Army – then they called
it the national police reserve. He became an ad-
visor, and spent three years in Japan. I went
to two different schools in California as we
awaited orders to join him. My mother, brother,
and I traveled to Japan in a convoy - the USS
Patrick – twelve days on the water. We were
escorted by a bunch of ships - Patrick was taking
troops to Korea and we had the requisite alerts
and evacuation drills. He met us in Yokahama
Bay. I attended a school at the camp we lived
at for close to two years.
BILL DUNN: Were you at Camp Zama
when you lived in Japan?
BRIAN MCENANY: No. We lived about
150 miles north of Tokyo. We lived near the little
town of Jimachi, about twenty miles from Sen-
dai, on an army base that had been an old Japa-
nese Army post. It was where the 24th Division
came to when they returned from Korea.
My dad was posted in Akita which was the
old samurai capital. He was still another hun-
dred miles north of us and he came home on
the train on the weekends. We visited during
the summer and spent time with him. There
wasn’t any real place for dependents in Akita
at that time. The school at Camp Younghans
had multiple grades in the same classroom -
not too many children present.
In 1953, Dad was re-assigned to New York
City and I attended Public School 201 in Brook-
lyn - Bay Ridge - in 1953-54. He was posted to
New York City as part of the National Guard
and Reserve Bureau. The office was on 42nd
Street - way out toward the docks. We lived in
Brooklyn in Bay Ridge – right outside of Fort
Hamilton. There were a number of government
apartment buildings there. We lived there for
five years and that was the first time I had
a chance to have a school where I didn’t have
to leave in the middle or end of a school year.
My math teacher at PS 201 - Mrs McDonough
urged me to apply to Brooklyn Technical High
School which required a competitive exam to
enter. I successfully passed the entrance exam
and graduated four years later on the 26th of
June 1958. Four days later, I reported to West
Point on the 1st of July 1958.
BOBSHELDON:Did you take a lot of math
and science since you went to a technical high
school?
BRIAN MCENANY: Yes. Brooklyn Tech
was one of the premier high schools in New
York City along with the Bronx High School of
Science and Evander Childs High School in
Queens. Tech was an all-boys high school at
that time. The curriculum included vocational
courses and a college prep course that was
heavy in mathematics and engineering. I took
all the college prep courses, plus a bunch of vo-
cational classes. Quite a mixture of things: print
shops and foundry, all the wood shops, metal
shops, electrical engineering, mechanical engi-
neering, and mechanical drawing. What I didn’t
get was a lot of chemistry and biology that I
found out later in life I had missed out on. But
Tech was more engineering than anything else.
I laugh now when I see pictures of ‘‘geeks.’’
The pocket protector, the pencils, the slide rules,
etc. I carried all those things to all my classes –
almost everyone in the school did.
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The Tech vocational programs fed the many
trades in New York City. If you went through
one of its courses and you didn’t go to college,
you were not a neophyte when you applied
for a job - you were already trained.
BOB SHELDON: Had West Point always
been where you wanted to go to college?
BRIANMCENANY: Pretty much. When my
father was trekking around the country, we often
stayed with my aunt and uncle near Vails Gate,
New York on their farm about twenty miles
north of West Point. When my dad was off some
place we’d come back and stay there. My uncle
was a chef in the British Navy during World
War I and after World War I he took a job with
the Cunard Line. He made good money -
enough to buy 150 acres in upstate New York.
When we lived in Newburgh or at the Farm,
my mother used to bring my brother and me
to West Point to hear the band concerts there. I
can remember sitting up in the balcony in the
old theater watching the cadets and the band. I
don’t think I ever really gave much thought to
anything except going to West Point.
BOB SHELDON: Talk a little bit about your
West Point years. How was it for you as a new
cadet and your education there?
BRIAN MCENANY: When I entered West
Point in July 1958, plebes were not allowed to
leave the Academy for the entire first year.
That’s all changed now. Graduates of West Point
always say that ‘‘the Corps has!’’ – and that’s
because it’s always changed after you left.
At Christmas time we had to stay at the
Academy. My company (H-2) was a great group
of guys. The plebes took over everything from
first captain all the way down to squad leaders
during the Christmas break. For two weeks,
the plebes basically ran the cadet portion of
the Academy. My folks came up to see me over
Christmas. They lived in New York City during
my first two years, so that helped me out.
The rest of the time was pretty much heavy
academics and swimming. I was on the swim-
ming team in high school and I joined the swim-
ming team at West Point. I started playing water
polo which I enjoyed very much. The water polo
team was a club then and we did pretty well.
Two of our guys went to the Olympic water polo
trials in 1960. It wasn’t a corps athletic team. We
played Navy once and we’d play Yale and Har-
vard. We played the New York City Athletic
Club, some of the community colleges, New
York University (NYU), and also some senior
high schools. We had probably ten or twelve
meets during the winter. The USA swimmer
who took the gold medal in the 1960 summer
Olympics swam for Yale. When we swam
against them we didn’t worry about getting
the ball on the initial swim off, we figured he
was going to get it and he always did.
BILL DUNN: When you say you couldn’t
leave the Academy, do you mean that literally?
You couldn’t even go down to Highland Falls?
BRIANMCENANY:That’s correct. We were
not allowed to leave the Academy grounds. We
were also restricted to what was called ‘‘The
level of the Plain’’ for the most part. You could
not go below the level of the plain unless you
were invited to go to an instructor’s house or
to an academic class or athletics. That did not ap-
ply to Flirtation Walk however. In general, you
were not allowed to leave the boundaries of
the Academy which often led to people going
over the wall. I did not, but we got in more trou-
ble anyway. (Laughter)
BOB SHELDON: Did you have a major at
West Point?
BRIANMCENANY:No. At that time (1958-
1962) there was a standard set of courses lead-
ing to a Bachelor of Science degree, but no major.
That came later. We had no electives until my ju-
nior year at West Point. Majors became part of
the curriculum in 1982 as part of a major change
in the curriculum, partly undertaken to be able
to satisfy the credential requirements of the Ac-
creditation Board of Engineering and Technol-
ogy (ABET). Over the next few years, the
majors were expanded and incorporated into
the present curriculum that allows a cadet to fol-
low course material leading to majors in a num-
ber of disciplines.
I was allowed only one elective my Junior or
Cow year, and then during First Class year I
could select one elective per semester. That
was the only time that you could take courses
outside of the standard curriculum.
BILL DUNN: Was that bachelor’s degree
considered a Bachelor of Engineering?
BRIAN MCENANY: It just says Bachelor
of Science. But if you go back through history
it was engineering because West Point was the
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premier civil engineering university in the en-
tire country for many years. The United States
didn’t issue civil engineering degrees until
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) issued
the first degrees in the 1830s.
So having a degree from West Point a hun-
dred years before my class was very important
because after the graduates left the Army they
knew they could earn a good living as construc-
tion managers of various projects and what not.
But it was a Bachelor of Science degree; that’s all
it says on our diplomas. As I mentioned earlier,
the ABET forced West Point to adopt specific en-
gineering sequences so its graduates would
meet the requirements of engineering graduate
programs in other universities.
BILLDUNN: Finishing up at West Point, did
you have some hand in your choice of branch?
BRIAN MCENANY: Yes. When I was at
West Point, you stayed in the same company all
four years and I was lucky enough to have the
same roommates for three out of the four years.
Jim Worthington (unfortunately, he passed away
last year) was a star man - top five percent in the
class - and he helped us quite a bit through aca-
demics. Jim’s dad was a grad and a brigadier
general. My other roommate was Dick Stephen-
son from Dry Ridge, Kentucky. His dad was
a State tobacco inspector and Dick went to Ken-
tucky Military Institute before West Point. I think
he was the First Captain at that school.
Selecting what branch we wanted was not
really random, it was more a classical OR sur-
vey approach, if you will. In 1960, the Academy
sent the Second Class (my class) on trips to var-
ious army bases. We went to Fort Belvoir and
my roommates and I built bridges when it was
about 110 degrees. Nobody wanted to go in the
Engineers because it was so damn hot.
We went to Fort Monmouth, NJ, and
watched the Signal Corps parade static displays
of radios on trucks back and forth in front of the
stands. Nobody wanted to be in the Signal
Corps.
We went to Fort Bliss, Texas, and watched
the air defense rockets miss their targets, and
then saw the aerial targets crash. Nobody
wanted to go into the Air Defense.
During the summer preceding our First
Class year, we went to Fort Knox and the Com-
mandant reamed us out because everybody fell
asleep during the lectures. That turned us off on
the Armor branch.
We went to Fort Benning, Georgia, where
we banged around in the back of an Armored
Personnel Carrier (APC). I ended up hitting
my forehead on the front sight of my rifle. Dick,
Jim and I never considered the Infantry.
When we arrived at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, they
treated us more like gentlemen. We had a big bar-
becue in the Wildlife Refuge and they allowed us
into the Officers Club. When we returned to West
Point, the survey was over – there was no way we
were going to do anything except go into the Field
Artillery – which made my dad happy. (Laughter)
The process at the Academy of actually be-
ing assigned to one branch or the other was
a class drawing. You put your branch selections
in priority order on a slip of paper, and then
depending on the officer strengths in those par-
ticular branches and your rank in class, you
would, hopefully, end up with your first choice.
The Regular Army was constrained in
strength when I graduated - this was just before
Vietnam. Most of the guys who graduated at the
top of the class selected the Engineers.
Then as the drawing continued, it would go
down the list: Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery,
Air Defense. The guys at the bottom of the class
normally ended up in the Signal Corps.
BILL DUNN: Where’d you go to your
branch school?
BRIAN MCENANY: Fort Sill.
BILL DUNN: How long was that?
BRIAN MCENANY: At that time it was an
eight-week course. We received a little less than
sixty days of leave and then went to Fort Sill for
an eight-week course. When we graduated, we
had a four-year obligation. We were also re-
quired to go into one of the five combat arms
at that time. Additionally, you were required
to attend Airborne School or Ranger School, or
you could go to both. I elected to go through
both of them. So, after Fort Sill, I went to Ranger
School at Fort Benning in November and then in
January 1963, attended Airborne School. It was
March 1963 before I arrived at my first unit.
BOB SHELDON: Did you find Airborne
and Ranger School pretty challenging?
BRIANMCENANY:Ranger School more so
than Airborne because we did Ranger School
first. After nine weeks of Ranger School,
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we could have done anything. We were invinci-
ble – ,grin.. But, we were all physically
drained by the last week of Ranger School. We
slept almost an entire weekend, and then we
started Airborne School on Monday morning.
BOB SHELDON: Where was your first as-
signment out of school?
BRIAN MCENANY: I spent all three
years assigned in Munich, Germany with the
3rd Battalion, 11th Artillery, 24th Infantry Divi-
sion. Some in my class went to places like Oki-
nawa with the 173rd Brigade or to the 25th
Division in Hawaii or with one of the Airborne
Divisions (82nd or 101st).
Several years later, when I look back at those
first assignments, the people in my class who
took a three-year tour in Europe only went to
Vietnam once, maybe twice if you were Infantry.
Those that took a short tour in the States or what
started out to be a short tour with the 173rd,
probably went back to the Republic of Vietnam
(RVN) two or three times.
In Germany in 1963, my battalion changed
from 155 towed howitzers to eight-inch towed
howitzers and ended up as a self-propelled
155 unit at the end. The 3/11th was the general
support artillery battalion for the 24th Division.
In addition, there were three direct support bat-
talions and an Honest John battalion. Four or
five of my classmates were stationed in Munich
at the same time.
I was stationed at a place called Will
Kaserne on the outskirts of Munich. Across the
street from us was Warner Kaserne. Warner
Kaserne was an old SS barracks during WWII.
The German Army built a Potemkin-like village
next door and camouflaged the kaserne. The al-
lied bombings destroyed about eighty percent
of Munich, but they never hit the barracks.
BOB SHELDON: Did you spend any time
near the wall?
BRIANMCENANY:No, I did not go to Ber-
lin. My battery was converted to nuclear config-
uration and they slapped travel restrictions on
pretty much anybody that had anything to do
with that. So I was not allowed to go to Berlin
during the whole time I was there.
BOB SHELDON: Did you get to see some
of the other historical sites in Germany?
BRIAN MCENANY: Yes. I will tell you a
story about traveling around Germany. As a sec-
ond lieutenant I was a Fire Direction Officer, the
normal first assignment you get in an artillery
battery. We went to Grafenwo¨hr training area
twice a year for about forty-five days. The train-
ing area was about five or six kilometers from
the Czech border.
My Battalion Executive Officer was an old
time artilleryman. He still had his Cavalry
license. One afternoon he came into the battery
position and looked like he was freezing to
death, so I asked, ‘‘You want a cup of coffee,
Sir?’’ He said, ‘‘Sure.’’ So I took him over to
the mess hall and filled up a mug. And I said,
‘‘Would you like coffee, cream, or sugar?’’ And
he said, ‘‘Put some sugar in there.’’ So I reached
into this brown paper bag and dumped two
great big tablespoons of what I thought was
sugar in his coffee. When he took the first sip,
he spit it out – it seems the brown bag was full
of salt. The next morning, I was on orders as
an escort officer for a United Service Organiza-
tions (USO) show for forty-five days. So I saw
a lot of Germany. (Laughter)
BOB SHELDON: Did you exercise with
any of your German counterparts?
BRIAN MCENANY: Yes, with the German
mountain artillery at Berchtesgaden, a town off
the autobahn when you travel toward Salzburg,
Austria. We had a very good relationship with
that unit. They invited us to a formal dinner
with dress blues; we had to rappel into the din-
ing room. (Laughter) An interesting way to do it.
BOB SHELDON: Where were you off to
next?
BRIAN MCENANY: The most important
thing that happened in Germany was that’s
where I met my wife. Lillian worked as a secre-
tary for the Army, ostensibly. Actually I was un-
aware she worked for the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA). I met her about three months af-
ter I arrived in Germany and before she rotated
out. We’d talk back and forth by telephone after
she left – the Bundespast long distance charges
cost about $25.00 for three minutes at that time.
She came back to Germany once to visit me and
I finally encouraged her to come back and get
married in 1965.
I was a Battery Commander as a first lieu-
tenant, and when I was promoted to captain. I
became the Battalion operations officer (S-3).
The initial drawdowns for Vietnam were
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underway in 1966 and we lost a lot of the Non-
Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and officers.
When I left in mid-1966, the battalion had three
officers left: the battalion commander; one offi-
cer signed for A and B batteries; one officer
signed for C and D batteries; and the Sergeant
Major – the senior enlisted man in the battalion.
Most of the senior NCOs were gone – those who
remained were junior sergeants or low-ranking
enlisted. This was the first push to pull all the
NCOs and officers back to send the first wave
into Vietnam.
After leaving Germany in May 1966, I
attended the career course at Fort Sill. At that
time, the artillery branch was split into artillery
and air defense branches. You spent six or seven
months at Fort Sill and then two months at Fort
Bliss, Texas. The time we spent at Fort Sill was
all field artillery command and tactics – it was
a mid-level career course. We spent quite a bit
of time doing all the normal things for the career
courses; the command and control, gunnery, ar-
tillery tactics, learning about staff and higher
level organizations, etc. We went to Fort Bliss
and did the same thing there, but in a more com-
pressed time period.
I received orders to Vietnam while I was in
the career course. There were only sixty or se-
venty in the class. About half of them had al-
ready been to Vietnam and the rest of us were
going. There wasn’t any question in my mind
that was going to happen. If you went to the per-
sonnel section in Washington and saw all the big
stacks of records on the assignment officer’s
desks – it was like, ‘‘He goes, he stays, he goes,
he stays.’’ I’m sure that’s the way it’s happening
right now with Iraq.
BOB SHELDON: When did you go to Viet-
nam?
BRIAN MCENANY: The career course
lasted until December 1966. When I was put
on orders to Vietnam, I was assigned to the Mil-
itary Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV).
At that time you went through language train-
ing at the JFK Special Warfare Center at Fort
Bragg, North Carolina, for about six weeks or
so. From there, I went to Vietnam in March 1967.
BILL DUNN: You were a captain then?
BRIAN MCENANY: I was a captain at that
time. When I got to Vietnam I was assigned as
an advisor to a Vietnamese 155 howitzer battal-
ion in the highlands near Pleiku in the Second
Corps Tactical Zone. My counterpart was in
the career course before me at Fort Sill, so there
wasn’t a hell of a lot that I could teach him about
artillery that he did not already know.
We had interesting discussions between us.
I was his advisor for about seven months. The
two sergeants on my team and I built a school
for the children of the battalion – turned 500-lb
bomb containers into water tanks – welded
155 powder canisters together to form poles
for swing sets, provided 105mm ammunition
boxes for the Vietnamese to build desks. While
I was there, my younger brother arrived in Da
Nang with a Seabee battalion. He was killed
near the end of October in Da Nang. I became
my brother’s escort officer and brought him
back to Florida and then went back to Vietnam.
BILLDUNN:Was this your older brother or
younger brother?
BRIAN MCENANY: Younger brother. He
never told anybody that I was already there be-
cause he wanted to go with his friends. The rule
was sons were not supposed to be in country at
the same time – a rule that came about after
WWII – if you remember hearing about the
death of five Sullivan brothers on one of the
Navy destroyers. His death left me in a sole sur-
viving son category which was then stamped
on my personnel records.
When I returned to Vietnam, in the latter
part of 1967 after his funeral, I received a tele-
gram from my old battalion commander, LTC
Clayton Moran, who was now Chief of the Field
Artillery Branch in Washington. He said, ‘‘We’re
opening up a new program called Operations
Research (OR) and we think you’re qualified.
Would you like to go?’’ And I said, ‘‘Hell yes!
Get me out of here.’’
I soon received paperwork from Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute (RPI). The Army OR pro-
gram, at that time, was split into ORSA Engi-
neering and ORSA Business. I think you took
similar courses. The Engineering or Business
lines were just a question of where the money
came from to pay for it. The schools included
six or seven universities. The Army would send
you to Stanford, if it had the money, or Georgia
Tech, Tulane, Arizona State, or RPI. West Point
sent their new math instructors for the USMA
Math Department to RPI.
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The registrar at RPI said I had to take the
Graduate Record Examination (GRE). I said,
‘‘Okay,’’ wrote to my wife and said, ‘‘Get me
one of those GRE work books.’’ She sent the
book over and, after dutifully finishing my days
with the Vietnamese battalion, I would spend an
hour or so in the evenings going through the
practice tests.
There was a test center set up to take the
GREs near Nha Trang on the coast. That was
the location of the headquarters of 1st Field
Force Vietnam (IFFV). During Tet, the Viet Cong
(VC) occupied the test center and it was blown
away in the fighting. I sent a letter to the regis-
trar at RPI and said, ‘‘I have a slight problem.
You asked me to take the GRE and I can’t do
it.’’ After I explained why, they sent me a letter
that said, ‘‘Okay we’ll waive your requirement
for that one.’’
I returned to the States in March, took some
leave, and arrived at RPI at the end of April or
beginning of May. I was assigned to the Reserve
Officer Training Corps (ROTC) detachment for
about two months until summer school began.
For the next twenty months or so, I studied the-
ory and practical OR.
BILL DUNN: Was that a fairly structured
program with a set of courses you were sup-
posed to take?
BRIAN MCENANY: Yes, actually, it was an
interdisciplinary curriculum. The Management
School had the primary responsibility for it, but
it was interdisciplinary with Electrical Engineer-
ing (EE) and the Math Department. We took
some theory courses with Math and then some
practical courses over in EE. Most of the courses
were taught in the Management School. Some of
the professors who taught us statistics were from
General Electric (GE) who ran the GE Quality
Control Program at Schenectady. The program
was pretty comprehensive and concentrated
more on the practical than the theoretic.
I received a Master’s Degree in ORSA and
Statistics from RPI in January 1970. I was there
long enough and took enough courses that I
qualified for a second degree, a Master’s Degree
in Management, but I didn’t receive it when I
graduated. We ran into a problem with the Dean
of the Management School. I was the first one to
graduate under the RPI OR program. He told
the nine of us one morning in our last semester
‘‘I’m only going to graduate the ORSA/Stat
people with one degree. I don’t care how many
courses you took.’’ And we said, ‘‘Dean, you’ve
been taking the money from the Army. We’ve
qualified for a second degree.’’ He said, ‘‘I don’t
care; I’m not going to do it.’’
He said, ‘‘If you (Brian McEnany) force the
issue and try to get your second degree, I can’t
stop you from doing that, but I will graduate
the other guys earlier and not allow them to
do it.’’ I said, ‘‘Okay’’, and I took the ORSA de-
gree. A year later the Dean retired, and we all
sent back to RPI and got the second degrees be-
cause we’d already fulfilled the requirements
for them.
After graduation in January of 1970, I was
assigned to the Pentagon. I picked up the 49 spe-
cialty code a little bit later.
I initially worked for the Director of Cost
Analysis (DCA) in the Army Comptroller’s Of-
fice for the better part of about a year and a half.
We did all the costing for the Army’s portion of
the Joint Strategic Operations Plans (JSOP) for
the Joint Staff. I developed some simple com-
puter programs to develop the costs along with
the standard inputs from all the Army offices.
Our office pulled all the costs together. The
available computer systems in the early 1970s
were very difficult to get time on. You didn’t
have all the computer terminals and desktops
available to you then. You had to find time on
an IBM 360 or 370.
When I worked for Cost Analysis, their
computer system was located at L’Enfant Plaza
in Washington, DC. So at night I used to have to
take decks of input cards into Washington to
cost out the plans, and then bring the printouts
back to the Pentagon. I wrote a small BASIC pro-
gram to extract and print the cost information in
the proper format to submit to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS).
BILL DUNN: Was the Army Concepts
Analysis Agency (CAA) [later the Center for
Army Analysis] established at that time?
BRIAN MCENANY: Yes, CAA was formed
by merging the Strategy and Tactics Analysis
Group (STAG) together with elements of HQDA
(Headquarters, Department of the Army) and
the Combat Developments Command and pro-
viding additional personnel spaces. At the same
time, I was part of the Study Advisory Group
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helping Research Analysis Corporation (RAC)
build part of the FOREWON (Force and
Weapons) force planning system. My job was
to work with them to develop the cost module
that was part of the ATLAS (A Tactical, Logis-
tics, and Air Simulation). When they built the
ATLAS War Game, I was on the Study Advisory
Group (SAG) as the representative for DCA.
At that time RAC was doing all the work
and their offices were in the West Gate Research
Park, near Tysons Corner, Virginia. About once
every two or three months we’d come out and
listen to the progress reports.
In addition to the joint plans, I became inter-
ested in some theoretic work being done by
OSD PA&E. During my first year at DCA
(1970), there were some people at OSD Systems
Analysis (George Patton, Chris Snyder, Dick
Simkowski) who developed a concept of using
input-output models to assist in preparing
the Tentative Fiscal Guidance Memorandum
(TFGM) issued to the Services and, subse-
quently, to evaluate the Service Program Objec-
tive Memorandum (POM) submissions. The
TFGM was issued using Fiscal Guidance Cate-
gories - a different sorting of Program Elements
from the Five-Year Defense Plan (FYDP) Major
Programs.
The OSD model passed the Service inputs
(in the same format as the FYDP) through an
input-output model. I was part of a small group
in 1970 that created the Army model to be used
in that system - really a set of Cost Estimating
Relationships (CERs) that created direct and in-
direct costs of force structure. The Army system
was called the Mark Twain System and we
(Marc Blum, Dick Simkowski, and I) created
the system to assist the staff in evaluating the
POM. However, it turned out to be more useful
as a post-analysis tool of the POM inputs rather
than a predictive one. I wrote a paper on how
we developed it for use in the Army and pre-
sented it at one of the Army OR symposiums.
The work I did with the Mark Twain System
brought me some recognition by the Army’s
Program Analysis and Evaluation (PAE) office
and I was transferred to the Assistant Vice Chief
of Staff (AVCS) Office for Plans, Programs, and
Analysis (PPA) run by General Dupuy in 1971.
At that time the AVCS was responsible for pro-
viding the Army Staff guidance as to how to re-
spond to the POM. Several years later, during
my second tour in Army PAE, it changed. When
General Meyer became the DCSOPS (G-3 of the
Army), he stated that he was going to be the pri-
oritizer. Up to that point in time the AVCS office
did it.
The AVCS office dealt with the Secretariat,
the Chief of Staff, and developed the guidance
for the Army Staff. Once the guidance was re-
leased, the office later reviewed the Army Staff’s
efforts to put the POM together. In 1972 and
1973, we worked for MG Herb McCrystal. LTC
(later General) Max Thurman was my team
leader and he was probably the most powerful
lieutenant colonel in the United States Army.
He nearly drove the POM process by himself.
PAE was a lot of high-level visibility and,
unfortunately, a lot of late night hours. My wife
still says that no matter what I told her about
only having one-year tours in Korea and Viet-
nam, I actually spent a five-year isolation tour
where I didn’t see her or the children very
much. We bought a house in Manassas, know-
ing that we’d end up being assigned here in
Washington at least once or twice more. At that
time, I really didn’t know that I would have so
many tours at the Pentagon.
The Mark Twain System required us to cre-
ate a large deck of IBM punch cards as input.
The Army Management Systems Support
Agency (USAMSSA), the same facility that sup-
ported the development of the budget, and the
Army Staff were down in the basement of the
Pentagon, and they did a pretty good job of sup-
porting our office in PPA.
They had big IBM 370s and we would drop
the decks off, go get a Coke at the cafeteria -
the Goalpost - and they would run through
it, if they didn’t drop the card deck on the
floor. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
(DCSPER) had a Computation of Manpower
Programs by Linear Programming (COMPLIP)
model – a large, linear programming model that
calculated how the Army should theoretically
distribute its manpower into Force Structure;
Transients, Trainees, Patients, Prisoners and
Students (TTPPS) accounts; force structure,
recruiting, etc., over a five-year period. There
were a lot of external number calculations be-
fore they ran it. It was one of the models we
had to understand because PAE was trying to
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direct certain changes in the Army’s force and
end strength.
There was a lot of uncertainty at the end of
1972. The draft was ending. The Army had nine-
teen divisions and was trying to decide where all
of them were going to be stationed after Vietnam.
The Army strength changed drastically. The
force went from nineteen to eleven divisions. In
1972, over 800,000 people either left or entered
the Army and there was great uncertainty about
what the force structure was really going to be.
But when those decisions were made, we had to
provide the correct POM guidance to the Staff
and try to figure out the outyear impacts.
PAE (really PPA) was staffed with all OR
guys – Max Thurman believed that hard science
people worked harder so he staffed the office
with ORSA-pods. Most of the key decisions
were made in PAE, along with their resource
implications over five years, and codified in
a guidance document that was sent to the Staff.
Once that document was issued, the Army Staff
began the process of preparing the POM in Five
Year Defense Program format – at Program Ele-
ment Level – and in written form. The transla-
tion of DoD guidance, which was issued in
terms of outlays in the early days, into appropri-
ation level guidance was the responsibility of
PAE and the Comptroller’s office. Because out-
lays were actually money spent, it became criti-
cal to understand how much money was
available for new and/or revised programs
over time. Each appropriation spends out dif-
ferently over time. Military Pay is spent almost
entirely in its first year - hence manpower deci-
sions are almost immediate. Operation money
spends over a couple of years–most of it in the
first year. Research & Development (R&D) and
Procurement funds have little impact immedi-
ately, most spend out over three to five years
or more. I became quite involved in a project
that estimated the impact of outlays on appro-
priations that year.
The process included the establishment of
the Program Guidance Review Committee
(PGRC) that was formed to monitor the evolu-
tion of the POM and its impact on the upcoming
budget – In the early 1970s, there was almost
no multi-year consideration beyond the bud-
get year. A few exceptions did look beyond the
budget – the R&D and Procurement programs
stretched out was a number of years. The PGRC
committee allowed multi-years assessment to
take place. I am sure that you will get arguments
over its efficacy in making things happen or not.
Reg Shrader (author of History of OR in the
United States Army) and I differed over how the
POM was actually developed in the early years
- how analysis was included in its preparation.
The Army documents he reviewed and used
showed the actual document preparation and
submission. The analytic underpinnings were
not visible in the final document, save for the
force structure arguments where modeling
was used to show the impact of reductions or
changes in mix of equipment (modernization).
The guidance documents and how they were
prepared and directed were not included in that
work. But, I submit, the development of the
guidance package was where any analysis was
performed and where information was pro-
vided to the Army leadership - the Secretary,
the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), and
through the Select Committee (SELCOM). I
spent a lot of time behind the overhead screen
in the SELCOM room listening to what the gen-
erals were arguing and deciding. General
Dupuy guided us to provide succinct point pa-
pers and flip chart presentations for him to ar-
gue major points during POM preparation.
Finally, the communication of Army deci-
sions to the DoD leadership was an important
part of the POM process. PAE oversaw the prep-
aration of the documents carried by the Secre-
tary and CSA into meetings with the SECDEF,
Comptroller and OSD PA&E, particularly when
the Program decisions were being negotiated.
Army PAE spent much time working with
OSD PA&E offices (Land Forces at that time)
attempting to reduce or eliminate major cuts to
Army programs. We were still in advance of
the ‘‘Bow Wave’’ of the late 1970s and the Army
suffered greatly from the effects of the Vietnam
War – seven years of degradation of conven-
tional forces and its equipment, and I suspect
that will be true when it returns from Iraq
and Afghanistan as well. Anyway, the meeting
documents often took the form of arguments
and counter-arguments, supplemented by
graphics wherever possible. I remember com-
pressing several pages of backup material into
a single, bulletized sheet broken into Army
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position, OSD positions, arguments, and counter-
arguments along with a very small graphic that
attempted to show the outyear impact of military
and civilian manpower drawdowns. The com-
munication of that information was the impor-
tant part. Max Thurman, when he became the
Director of PAE, used a set of flip charts to de-
scribe the Army program to OSD and Congres-
sional staffers. We had to be extremely careful
with the Congressional package – a tank graphic
with a gun barrel pointed toward the Capitol was
sure to get some comment from the staffers that
interrupted the briefing.
BOBSHELDON:Did you use your analytic
background in PAE in the Army Staff job?
BRIAN MCENANY: Yes, I mentioned ear-
lier that I was involved in estimating the impact
of outlays on appropriations. I helped build a dy-
namic programming model (DFAM – Dynamic
Financial Analysis Model) that allowed PAE to
estimate the availability of appropriation level
money right from the start of the process. The
development of that model and the Mark Twain
System were the only real theoretic works I par-
ticipated in while part of the Army Staff. The
creation of a dynamic programming model
allowed us to estimate what the TFGM outlay
impacts were on Army appropriations for all
five years of the POM. I was part of a small
group (few of us ORSA-pods) that used the
five-year spend out or outlay rates for the vari-
ous appropriations to estimate how much avail-
able money there was in each appropriation.
DFAM allowed us to estimate how much money
was available for new programs.
There was not a lot of serious analytic work
done on the Staff. I would guess that RAC and
then GRC provided most of the true analysis
work for the Staff. I think that PAE contrib-
uted to several important analytic projects over
time – force packages and pair-wise comparison
of programs. I helped work with groups that used
and developed those capabilities. However, most
of my work lay in the development of programs
to display or estimate information and create
the ability for PAE to track decisions. For exam-
ple, I built a little tracking program that displayed
the five-year decisions going into the POM at ap-
propriation level. The output was added to the
Form-1, the official document used to distribute
resource and structure information to the Staff.
When the Staff came back with the detailed
program level changes, PPA would review the
inputs to determine whether or not the deci-
sions had actually been incorporated. We ran
into some trouble with the Staff over incorrect
data incorporation at times. The generals in
the Staff did not like to have majors and lieuten-
ant colonels tell them they were wrong.
The initial force package concepts were de-
veloped by PPA. We helped build them but not
the way they are being calculated now. The con-
cept was initially established to help zero-base
the Army in 1973. Another effort that came
from PPA was to make use of pair-wise compar-
isons to develop the initial prioritization of
Army programs to see which ones could be
funded - which ones fell above or below the line.
It provided a first-cut level of information to the
decision makers. The list was then reviewed
by the decision makers – rightly so - the list
was a theoretic prioritization and people had
to judge its credibility. These efforts all came
from officers who had attended OR graduate-
level training and were assigned to PPA. The
pair-wise project was incorporated into the sort-
ing of programs at major command level. I am
not sure if it is being used still – there are a num-
ber of computer based programs like Executive
Decision and the Analytic Hierarchy Process
that allows much of that to take place in confer-
ence rooms around a table nowadays.
In 1972 and 1973, there was an ongoing effort
to estimate the entire Army program using a deci-
sion support computer model. I was not involved
with its development. A lot of money was spent
on something called the ‘‘Dean Machine’’. LTC
Bob Dean developed it with computer support
from USAMSSA. However, it required someone
like a Lieutenant General Dupuy to sit down
for six or eight hours and make the decisions
about how the Army should spend procurement
money, R&D money, and any modifications to
Army strength. It was built, but not used in its
entirety – too complex. We ended up using var-
ious sub-programs to help display information
– which was part of what ORSA analysts did -
providing information back to the decision
makers. I think we did that quite well.
Providing information to the decision
makers was extremely important. Major Mike
Xenos and I worked together to generate an entire
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reporting system called the Program Optimiza-
tion and Budget Evaluation (PROBE) such that
the latest resource information could be sent
to the Staff through classified computer termi-
nals. Mike pushed the program to fruition and
he and I helped build the first terminal room -
a sensitive compartmented information facility
(SCIF) in PAE (3rd Floor, D-Ring, between 6th
and 7th corridors) - where we were able to access
USAMSSA through classified lines. Much of the
early resource information flow, the running of
DFAM, etc, and our reports were all run from
that room when it was up and running.
BOB SHELDON: What computer lan-
guages were you using back then?
BRIAN MCENANY: BASIC, FORTRAN 4,
and then FORTRAN 77. Some parts of the input-
output model I helped build were programmed
in COBOL, and other parts in FORTRAN by the
computer support analysts at USAMSSA. We
only had a very few desktop computers to work
with and the data being manipulated was too
great for 124K memory machines.
There is one item that I would like to add. It
refers to the work of Army PAE in the 1970s. Reg
Shrader and I disagreed over what the various
documents he uncovered during his research
meant or said. Army PAE initially came from
General Bill Dupuy and the Assistant Vice Chief
of Staff office. When I joined the AVCS office in
1972, MG Herb McChrystal headed the office
and it was composed of a Force Structure Team,
a Resource Team, and an Acquisition Team. The
Resource Team handled the Army POM and
Max Thurman headed the team as a LTC. PAE
was staffed by all OR analysts in its infancy.
When I returned to PAE in 1977-78, the mili-
tary spaces were later converted to Operations,
Personnel, Acquisition, and a few OR slots as
the manpower surveys took charge over the
years.
There were many military officers that
passed through PAE in the early days – Max
Thurman returned to take over as Director. Roy,
his brother, took over from MG McChrystal.
Max also commanded Recruiting Command,
then became the DCSPER and finally, the Vice
Chief of Staff Army (VCSA). Others that worked
in the office in the early days were Joe Palasta,
Carl Vuono, Colin Powell, Charlie Ostott, Larry
Butterworth, Frank Hillier (later became Assis-
tant Secretary of Army – Financial Management
(ASA-FM), Bill Roosma, Pat Roddy, Bob Howard,
almost all of them MGs or above by the time their
careers ended.
Max was tapped by General Dupuy to
staff the first Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) headquarters - the heads of the var-
ious directorates, etc. I spent some time with
him visiting Fort Monroe and Fort Meade, get-
ting a handle on what the splitting of Continen-
tal Army Command (CONARC) into Forces
Command (FORSCOM) and TRADOC really
meant. Max had always been the bad guy when
it came to personnel issues. He chewed up peo-
ple who did incomplete work - but I will tell you
that when I was flooded out during Hurricane
Agnes in June 1972, he and ten of the guys in
the office came out to my house in Manassas
and helped me sweep, flush, and carry stuff
out for a full day.
I learned a lot in PAE about providing infor-
mation to senior management. In mid-1973, I
was selected to go to the Armed Forces Staff
College (AFSC) at Norfolk (now the Joint Forces
Staff College) and from there to Korea.
BOB SHELDON: Was the Staff College
your choice?
BRIAN MCENANY: I would have pre-
ferred to go to Leavenworth as it was a one-year
course versus a six-month course at AFSC.
BOB SHELDON: How was that course?
BRIAN MCENANY: Interesting. My family
continued to live in Manassas. When I was at
AFSC, I left my family there so the kids stayed
in school. I lived at AFSC during the week and
then came back on the weekends. I did that for
the six months that I was there. It was my first ex-
perience with so many people from the Marines,
the Navy, and Air Force. My class also had ten
or eleven prisoners of war (POWs) that came
back out of Vietnam. In 1973 when they were
first released, most of them were in my class
at AFSC.
One afternoon, the ex-POWs arranged
a two-hour presentation of what it was like at
the Hanoi Hilton. We sat through and were ab-
solutely amazed at how these guys had existed
for that period of time. It was a time when Jane
Fonda had visited and the major letter writing
campaign pushed the VC and North Vietnam-
ese Army (NVA) to release them.
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The Admiral in charge was also one of the
POWs. John McCain was not in my class. I think
he was still having medical problems so he was
not in the class with us.
BOB SHELDON: What types of things did
you learn at AFSC?
BRIANMCENANY:Mostly pure Joint Staff
work and a better understanding of other Ser-
vice capabilities. It was going through the tactics
manuals and learning all the joint procedures.
We had a seminar war game at the end of the
course to help explain how force deployment
lists were created, and how joint logistics and
stationing were developed. Not a lot in the
way of analysis.
BOB SHELDON: Did you have an assign-
ment in mind when you went there?
BRIAN MCENANY: No. I was on a very
short list to take another short tour by that time.
So I pretty much knew that I was going to go to
Korea.
I received orders for Korea and had already
shipped my trunks when I received a telephone
call from the Pentagon saying, ‘‘We need to talk
to you. We’re going to change your orders.’’
When I arrived in Washington, I was told,
‘‘We’re going to send you to Phnom Penh in
Cambodia.’’ And I said, ‘‘You know what the
papers are saying about Phnom Penh?’’
This was 1975 and the Khmer Rouge was
taking over the country. The personnel officer
said, ‘‘Yes, but you speak French.’’ To which I said,
‘‘I haven’t spoken French since I left West Point.’’
‘‘Well, we’ll send you to the language course at
Monterey.’’ And I said, ‘‘Have you checked my re-
cords.’’ The guy looked at me and said, ‘‘What do
you mean?’’ And I said, ‘‘I’m a sole surviving
son.’’ And he said, ‘‘Okay.’’ Five or six days later
he said, ‘‘Okay, it’s your call.’’ (Laughter) But they
were already in the process of finding another
person that already knew French and didn’t have
to go back to language school. By the time the re-
placement was ready, Phnom Penh had fallen so
they didn’t send him anyway.
I ended up going to the 2nd Infantry Divi-
sion in Korea where I was a Battalion S-3, and
then a Battalion Executive Officer. Partway
through my tour, I was reassigned to the 2nd Di-
vision Artillery staff as the DIVARTY S-3.
BOB SHELDON: What part of Korea was
that?
BRIAN MCENANY: North of Seoul, ini-
tially, near a place where the 3rd Brigade was lo-
cated in the Western Corridor. I was assigned to
the 2nd Battalion, 17th Artillery and we provided
the artillery support to the units located across
the Imjin River near the Demilitarized Zone
(DMZ). We had one battery that was there at
all times.
When I first arrived, the battalion had just
been torn apart by a racial incident, and we
had a new battalion commander, a new exec,
four new battery commanders, and a new ser-
geant major. It took time to put the battalion
back together again. It was my first taste of what
was taking place in other parts of the world,
particularly, in Europe, with all of the racial is-
sues that took place in the Army after Vietnam.
BOB SHELDON: Back up for a minute.
Were you in Korea when they had the political
uprisings?
BRIAN MCENANY: No. That came after-
wards.
BOB SHELDON: Did you have any exer-
cises with your South Korean counterparts?
BRIAN MCENANY: Not directly. I am sure
that the division staff participated in joint exer-
cises, but I was not involved. General Hank
‘‘Gunfighter’’ Emerson commanded the 2nd Di-
vision. I did help rewrite the war plans, which in-
cluded support for the Korean divisions as part
of the US I Corps. The guy in charge of I Corps
was LTG James Hollingsworth. It was a joint
command and he had Korean officers on his staff.
Emerson pushed a broad education agenda
for the soldiers in the 2nd Division. I actually ran
a high school for a period of time - assigning of-
ficers to teach classes and encouraging soldiers
to get their General Educational Development
(GED). There was good field training, but very
difficult because of one-year tours – there were
always some new guys coming in and old guys
leaving every month. It made trying to create
well-trained units a challenge. I returned to
the States in 1975 and joined the Joint Staff.
BOB SHELDON: Who was your boss and
what was your office called?
BRIAN MCENANY: It was the Studies
Analysis Gaming Agency (SAGA) on the Joint
Staff. I had a series of bosses over the three years
I was there: RADM Gormely, RADM Morin, MG
Surut (USA), and Brig Gen Scott (USAF). Dr
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Frank Kapper was the scientific advisor - this is
the same office that Vince Roske, FS eventually
joined, although he was not part of SAGA when
I was there.
At that time, SAGA was broken into three
major divisions – a Political Military Division,
a Strategic Force Division, and a General Pur-
pose Division (where I was assigned). The Polit-
ical Military Division did all of the high-level
gaming with the JCS, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, Deputy CIA, etc. They would develop
three days of incident seminars for senior mem-
bers of the administration - more of what you
might call path games now. The Strategic Forces
Division was responsible for preparation of the
RISOP - the Red Integrated Strategic Operations
Plan - a red view of a missile strike against the
US. The General Purpose Division looked at ana-
lyzing war plans and force structure issues. Just
as I arrived, it was heavily involved with support
for the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR)
talks then underway with the Soviet Union.
ATLAS was being used to test out the vary-
ing NATO force levels being considered against
an 86-Division threat, a 120-Division threat, and
whatever else was being considered, e.g., mod-
ernization effects, reduced strength units, etc.
At that time, the Army was supporting MBFR
with the CONAF Evaluation Model (CEM) the-
ater combat model. I arrived at the tail end of the
MBFR studies. NOTE: CEM was originally cre-
ated by RAC for the Army as the Theater Com-
bat Model (TCM) in 1968. It then evolved into
the CONAF Evaluation Model (CEM I) around
1972. After several cycles of improvement,
and a shift of responsibility from the AVICE
(Army Vice Chief of Staff) office to ACSFOR
(Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development)
on the Army Staff, it was turned over to CAA
who renamed it the Concepts Evaluation
Model (CEM IV) in 1974. [www.rand.org/pubs/
monograph_reports/2005/RAND_MR243.pdf;
Shrader, C.R, History of Operations Research in the
US Army, Vol. III, 253]
My former Corps commander in Korea,
LTG Hollingsworth, and a team of officers went
to Europe and started tearing apart the Euro-
pean war plans, much the same as he had done
with the Korean plans. Hollingsworth’s group
was quite thorough and spent time trying to fig-
ure out the initial phases. There were some very
obvious things that were wrong with the plans
that started pushing the military in Europe to
modify its plans.
In a short period of time, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) became heavily in-
volved and the NATO Military Committee com-
missioned a study - a joint war game - with the
United Kingdom (UK), Germany, and the US an-
alyzing specific threats. The Supreme Headquar-
ters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) Technical
Center (STC) (specifically Rex Goad) adjudicated
the results. SAGAwas given the responsibility to
support the effort for the US.
In SAGA, we started out with ATLAS, and
rapidly shifted to a brand new theater-level
model called the Institute for Defense Analyses
Ground-Air Model (IDAGAM). I helped transi-
tion the model into the Joint Staff. We used it in
support of the assessment of the European war
plans. The study lasted for the better part of two
and a half years.
The Germans used an extremely fast running
attrition model. Their analytic center (Amt fur
Studien und Ubungen der Bundeswher) was near
Ottobrunn, south of Munich. The German military
provided operational advice to the scientists that
ran the model. Their version of the NATO war
lasted some three or four days - a matter of hours.
We worked with the UK at the Defense Op-
erational Analysis Establishment (DOAE) at
West Byfleet, UK. They also had a mixture of sci-
entists and officers working on the study where
the officers provided operational advice to the
scientists. The Brits would come in with a ten-
day game. So the adjudication process revolved
around whose attrition rates were the most be-
lievable. Rex Goad had his hands full.
At SAGA, we military officers provided both
sides operational assessment and the scientific
part of developing and running the model. There
was myself and a cigar-smoking Marine Corps
Lieutenant Colonel Jim Bugbee. Bugbee came
out of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). In
addition, we had two Air Force officers who were
trained at the Air Force Institute of Technology
(AFIT). Our game would last thirty days.
BOB SHELDON: You were assigned at the
Pentagon but you were on temporary duty
(TDY) to Europe a lot to work on this?
BRIAN MCENANY: About every three
months we would be either in Germany or in
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London, or we’d have the meetings here in Wash-
ington. I will tell you it’s very difficult to argue in
Whitehall when you’re in a long conference room
with all of those Dukes and Barons staring down
at you. At one meeting in 1976, the Germans
came to the table at Whitehall and they said if
we pursue discussions about a rear defense line,
that they would be court-marshaled. (Laughter) It
was politically unacceptable for them to establish
a hypothetical line (a rear defense line) and draw
their forces back even in a study.
Let’s back up a little. The adjudication pro-
cess revolved around attrition rates used within
the NATO group. The US attrition rates used in
IDAGAM were similar to the ones that were be-
ing used in ATLAS. ATLAS was no longer used
in support of the Joint Staff but continued in use
at CAA until 1982 where both CEM and ATLAS
were used. CEM was the principal theater-level
model for the Army’s force structure and assess-
ment studies. Both models used some Air Force
input. Navy input was not included in any of
the models at that time.
Both CEM and IDAGAM applied attrition
rates differently. IDAGAM used an anti-potential-
potential methodology. CEM used a force poten-
tial developed by a number of study groups that
determined what rates were to be used in CEM
for the upcoming year in support of the POM
and joint plans. In IDAGAM, as it was done in
CEM, each U.S. game ran in corridors - a typical
piston-type force-on-force approach, driven by
force ratios. It was a question as to how you cal-
culated scores for the force. Attrition, and how it
was distributed over the forces involved, was
done differently in all three country models
(US, UK, Federal Republic of Germany fFRGg).
After the initial results of the three models
were released, we tore apart the attrition section
of IDAGAM and worked with Air Force Studies
and Analyses Agency (AFSAA) to determine
the appropriate rates for the types of aircraft in-
volved. We had AFSAA help us put together an
acceptable set of rates for Air Force elements in-
cluded in IDAGAM. One afternoon I spotted
a couple of our Air Force compatriots sitting in
their office shooting paper clips at a model of
a MiG-25 on the ceiling. I said, ‘‘What are you
trying to do?’’ and he says ‘‘We’re trying to get
a random sampling of an attrition rate for an
F-4 against a MiG-25.’’ [Laughter]
The ground attrition rates were directly re-
lated to the rates of advance and the rates of ad-
vance were what we were seeing in the forward
edge of the battle area (FEBA) traces. It drove
how fast or how slowly the forward line of own
troops (FLOT) moved. There were several studies
at the time that talked about the rates of advance.
You can go back through the analytic history into
the 1960s and you’ll find rates of advance studies
and the history of where they all came from.
The model rates used in ATLAS, IDAGAM,
and CEM essentially came from a historical
legacy that was based on work done by two
Army lieutenant colonels (the Parson report)
that worked in the Operations Research Office
(ORO). I have a copy of their paper - SM-29-
CORG (ORO-OCAFF), dated 14 September
1954. They used World War II estimates of
yards given up as a function of force ratios. This
starting point was modified in several subse-
quent studies. Studies done in support of the
FOREWON system (ATLAS) changed yards to
kilometers, from kilometers sometimes into
miles. Various upgrades and modifications have
been made over the years, but that’s where the
original rates of advance came from. Each move-
ment of the forces then depended upon how the
force ratios between the forces in the various cor-
ridors were calculated. We attempted to make
IDAGAM replicate what CEM was using so that
we were consistent with what the Army was es-
timating in similar games.
The rates of advance and attrition were the
big issues adjudicated by the STC. In 1976 or
1977, STC produced a report on the study that
was delivered to a NATO Military Committee
working panel. This was the result of the two-
year effort and analyzed how the plans were
assessed by its principal members.
BOB SHELDON: This was a standard
Fulda Gap scenario?
BRIAN MCENANY: Part of it was Fulda
Gap; the other part was across the North German
Plain because we were playing the Brits and the
Germans as well as the U.S. and Netherlands di-
visions. We reconciled the three models so each
considered the same forces, the same conven-
tional weapons, and the differences came down
to the methodologies as to how attrition and
the rates of advance were being calculated in
the models.
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I point all this out to emphasize how large
models and their insatiable thirst for data re-
quire constant care. The ‘‘dragons’’ need to be
fed continually, and therein lies the problem: ac-
quiring credible data to feed it, understanding
how it is being manipulated inside the models,
and how the results are produced that spew
out in hundreds of pages of printouts. There is
no easy way to do that - it requires constant at-
tention to detail.
I have always abided by the following quote
that places the acquisition of data in the proper
context: ‘‘The government is very keen on amass-
ing statistics - they collect them, add them, raise
them to the nth power, take the cube root, and
prepare wonderful diagrams. But what you must
never forget is that every one of these figures
comes in the first instance from the village
watchman, who just puts down what he damn
pleases.’’ The quote is credited to Josiah Stamp,
1929.
I submit that each analyst must dig into the
methodologies and become sufficiently familiar
with how it works in all models before blindly
accepting its results. Not understanding the un-
derlying theory and how it is calculated in
models is a bad analysis habit. I saw this many
times when large models were used and new
analysts were assigned to projects using them.
Eventually the theater-level modeling com-
munity started taking different approaches. The
Vector model series, for example, used a dueling
methodology to calculate attrition in which you
had individuals and groups fighting against an
individual group. There was a specific rate for a
tank versus tank that took place. The Combined
Arms Computer Model (CARMONETTE) used
a different approach. (NOTE: CARMONETTE
was preceded by CARMON which was devel-
oped at ORO. The name ‘‘CARMON’’ comes
from ‘‘MONte CARlo;’’ MON and CAR were
inverted from MONCAR to CARMON. Now
CARMON was too large to run on available
computers. It was slimmed down and became
‘‘CARMONETTE.’’) The Army went through
a period where it attempted to reconcile the
use of battalion, brigade/Corps, and theater-
level models. The effort was only partially
successful - the last part, the upward shift to
theater-level, became too difficult. Take a look
at the history of how CARMONETTE and
Vector-in-Commander (VIC) evolved and were
used by the TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC)
and its agencies.
I also gave presentations on Decision Aids in
Crisis Planning at the 53rd and 54th MORS, and
Relative Combat Power during the 56th MORS.
In 1978, I went back to the Army Staff to work
for Max Thurman again when he was the Direc-
tor of the Army PAE. I had earlier worked for his
brother Roy in the 1973 time frame after Max left
PPA. So I worked for both of them. When I came
back to PAE in early ’78, we were still heavily in-
volved with development of the POM program. I
ended up coordinating many of the Army issues
between the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
and Plans (DCSOPS) and the Joint Staff on NATO
issues and programs. We did assessments in PAE
as to how NATO force structure was being
funded by the Army and how its equipment
was being modernized, etc.
The PROBE system was still in its infancy
when I returned to PAE. By the way, it still
serves as a way of distributing financial infor-
mation and decision information throughout
the Staff.
The POM guidance responsibility shifted
away from PAE and was concentrated in
DCSOPS by General Meyer. When he was the
DCSOPS, he argued that the DCSOPS was the
‘‘prioritizer for the Army’’, not the Chief’s of-
fice, and organized what became the ‘‘council
of colonels’’ to develop the POM guidance, etc.
I think PAE served as an ‘‘honest broker’’ rather
than having Army staff offices negotiate pro-
gram definitions and priorities, but that con-
tinues to be the way the Army creates its POM.
BOB SHELDON: What year was this?
BRIAN MCENANY: This was 1978.
BOBSHELDON:You were a lieutenant col-
onel by then?
BRIANMCENANY: I got promoted to lieu-
tenant colonel in 1978. In 1979 I had an opportu-
nity to go back to troops. The ORSA career field
at this time required you to stay current with
your basic branch which for me was artillery.
The basic concept was that you would pull an
ORSA tour and then you would pull an artillery
tour. Well, they were so short in the ORSA field
in the early days that I was pulling two back-
to-back ORSA tours before I went back for an
artillery tour.
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . MR. BRIAN R. MCENANY
Military Operations Research, V15 N3 2010 Page 101
I asked General Thurman for a release. He
said, ‘‘The only way I’ll release you out of here
is if you get a slot with a division,’’ and I was
able to get a slot with the 101st at Fort Campbell.
I was assigned as Division Artillery executive
officer, and ended up being the Deputy G-3,
and then the Plans Officer when the division be-
came heavily involved with planning for South-
west Asia.
BILL DUNN: Did you have a battalion
command in the 101st?
BRIAN MCENANY: No, that didn’t work
out. I was on several command lists as an alter-
nate. I had a wonderful tour out there. It was re-
ally great and I enjoyed it; my family enjoyed it.
By 1982, I was too senior a lieutenant colonel
and out of the battalion command zone.
In 1981, I wrote letters to E.B. Vandiver, FS
who at that time was the Technical Advisor to
the DCSOPS, and asked him if they had any slots
open in his office. They had a vacancy about
the time I came out of the 101st and I received or-
ders to the Tech Advisor’s office in DCSOPS in
1982. During that period I was selected for pro-
motion to full colonel. I remained with that of-
fice until I retired in December of 1983.
BOB SHELDON: Your last couple years on
active duty, were you using your OR back-
ground, or were you in a more managerial-type
position?
BRIANMCENANY:Mr. Vandiver made me
responsible for the Army’s NATO Assessment
Program. At that time, we were still trying to
find ways to compare Soviet block and NATO
block information. Net assessment is figuring
out the balance between the two and where vul-
nerabilities existed so there were some OR com-
ponents involved. One of those was trying to
better understand how the Soviet military cal-
culated the balance of forces. Van and I actually
reviewed classified technical documents that
explained it and we tried to feed it back into pla-
ces like Fort Leavenworth.
Much of the work I did over my career in
the Army was not theoretic - I don’t consider
myself to be a theoretician. I have always
thought that I did very well at applying meth-
odologies and models to the solution of Defense
Department problems.
BOB SHELDON: What were the two prob-
lems you were tackling?
BRIAN MCENANY: NATO Assessment
dealt continually with Andy Marshall’s Net As-
sessment office in Office of the Secretary of De-
fense. Van was involved with a lot more stuff in
his job, plus he supported Walt Hollis’s office in
the US portion of several multi-national commis-
sions, e.g., the Quadripartite commissions with
the Brits, Germans, Canadians and the Aussies.
I helped with one conference with the French.
Right at the end of my tour, just before I re-
tired, Vern Bettencourt, FS arrived at Mr. Hollis’
office, the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army
for Operations Research [DUSA(OR)]. I left in
December of 1983.
BILL DUNN: Vern came in as a lieutenant
colonel?
BRIANMCENANY:Yes, John Riente was in
the office at that time. Bill, you were part of the
Army Model Improvement Program office.
Gene Visco, FS was the MORS rep in Mr. Hollis’s
office and we dealt with Mr. Hollis’s office fairly
frequently. Mr. Vandiver was the Tech Advisor
when General Meyers was the Chief of Staff of
the Army.
BOB SHELDON: You spanned five tours in
the Pentagon on active duty. How did analysis
in the Pentagon change over those five tours?
BRIAN MCENANY: It seemed to have
almost a circular pattern; many of the same
problems came up frequently. Different meth-
odologies were tried to attack the same prob-
lems. Applications of models and the use of
analysis became more rigorous during the time
I was there; the justifications for Cost and Oper-
ational Effectiveness Analyses (COEAs) in sup-
port of acquisition programs became more and
more complex and heavily dependent upon ac-
quisition of great amounts of data to feed large
models. Mr. Vandiver, when he went to CAA,
was instrumental in pinning down what data
was needed and when. He reduced the time
lines for gathering it quite effectively.
There were not a lot of desktop computers
available during my tours. But as time passed,
more and more work was done in your office in-
stead of heading for the basement and the big
machine rooms. Analysis takes time and, I
would offer this as an opinion, the thinking
about a problem facing the Staff is the most im-
portant part. Nowadays, there seems to be a be-
lief that because computers operate so fast, that
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the time it takes to perform analysis should
mirror those improvements. Moore’s Law of
computer technology complexity increases ex-
ponentially every two years. It doesn’t mean
that analysis follows the same law. Half the
battle with any problem is understanding it
completely. Once that is accomplished, the
methodology to solve it usually becomes easy
to determine - the actual computer time, once
the model has been loaded and used, is faster -
but you still have to spend time thinking about
how to do it at the beginning and then analyzing
the results.
Analysis requires constant attention to de-
tails, assumptions, use of data, and at the end,
how the results are to be portrayed and used.
The longer you spend in the analysis business,
the more experience you gain – it takes more
than a few years to make an analyst, not just
a trip to ORSA-Military Applications Course
(ORSA-MAC) or graduate school. One of the
things that I remember about working for Gen-
eral Thurman was how he used to rip apart of-
ficers who would give him some incomplete
answer. He already knew basically what the an-
swer was. When you worked for him twice, he’d
sit and listen to what you had to say because
you’d gone through the same things that he
had, and you could tell him ‘‘No, General, that’s
the wrong thing to do,’’ and he’d listen to you.
But if you didn’t have that background - the ex-
perience gained by working the hard problems
over time, he did not let you off easily. He was
hard on people who gave him off-the-cuff an-
swers when he was the DCSPER and later as
the Vice Chief of Staff.
To me, it is always important to really un-
derstand the problem first. During my time at
Science Applications International Corporation
(SAIC), the staff officers we supported in the
Pentagon knew they had a big problem, but
were often incapable of defining how big. My
approach to working problems was to do it in
two parts - define the depth and breadth of the
problem first – understand it, then work on its
solution.
I think the decision makers remain hesitant
about accepting the results of models. They are
uncomfortable with responding to requests for
judgments or data. I remember a survey we sent
out from SAGA under the Joint Staff request
that asked for information about expectations of
attrition in Europe. No problems with responses
from brigade commanders, but the Corps and se-
nior commanders refused to provide any infor-
mation. This was all pre-Verification, Validation,
and Accreditation (VV&A). The best line I have
heard from a decision maker was from one of
the Navy Assistant Secretaries who, when being
briefed about study results, asked about verifica-
tion and validation of the models used. Then, ap-
parently content with the knowledge that the
models had been managed correctly, he took
the rest of the briefing.
Regarding Trevor DuPuy and his combat
models: there were at least two or three separate
studies that came from Mr. Hollis’s office, where
they assessed how DuPuy was generating his
information. There was one study that de-
scribed force potentials and the different ways
of doing it prepared by Dick Lester, I think:
the IDAGAM way, the CEM way, and there
was the DuPuy method for calculating attrition
based on historical research.
There was reluctance in the analysis com-
munity, I think mostly at Leavenworth, because
the structure of DuPuy’s model was not under-
stood. It wasn’t built by anybody in TRAC and
there was some hesitation to accept purely his-
torical rates. Part of the reason was the 1973
Mideast war produced greatly increased rates
of attrition and logistical supplies. If you only
used World War II rates, you would have prob-
lems trying to justify why it was so low in com-
parison to what had actually happened in the
Middle East. The Weapon Systems Assessment
Group (WSAG) did an extensive analysis of
the Mideast war. I reviewed five-inch thick
computer printouts of their information while
I worked on the NATO Military Committee
study in SAGA.
BOB SHELDON: Let’s go to your retire-
ment from the Army.
BRIANMCENANY:Officially, I left the Pen-
tagon on 1 January 1984. I was selected for pro-
motion to full colonel and was looking for
a new job. Colonel’s branch offered me some of
the same slots that I’d already occupied as a ma-
jor or lieutenant colonel. I began looking for slots
in Andy Marshall’s office and at National De-
fense University (NDU) when I got a phone call
from Dick Helmuth, one of my classmates, who
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was working for SAIC. Dick was a member of
the MORS Board of Directors (BoD) for a num-
ber of years. He told me ‘‘We are looking at
a Joint Staff offer to build a theater model and
we want to know if you might want to take
a look at our proposal?’’ I went out one after-
noon and reviewed their effort. They were look-
ing at a way of displaying forces without using
attrition rates. I provided some comments and
later received a call back saying they won the
contract. Dick called me and said ‘‘We won this
contract, and we think that you’re one of the
guys we need to make it happen.’’ At this time,
if I wanted to stay in the Army I could stay there
for another three years, get promoted and retire
as a full colonel, but I would have to find my
own slot. If I went to SAIC, it was going to be
pretty much an equal tradeoff. So I decided that
I was going to retire. Just before Christmas, in
December 1983, I went on leave and started
work for SAIC at Tysons Corner.
I began work on the State of the Art Contin-
gency Analysis (SOTACA) model as a senior
analyst and then became the Principal Investiga-
tor. We built the model using an analytic hierar-
chy process (AHP) approach to develop force
balances and assess capabilities where con-
ventional forces were not present. It was pro-
grammed in FORTRAN 77 and built over a 2-3
year period. It became part of the JCS Modern
Aids to Planning Program that Vince Roske and
Bill Lese (then on the Joint Staff) were in charge
of during their tenures as scientific advisors.
Bill Lese was the scientific advisor and who
we talked to on the Joint Staff; Vince Roske was
initially in the tech division as part of SAGA.
LtCol Don Theune, USMC, was the program of-
ficer I dealt with. He was a big SOTOCA fan and
it was used by the combatant commands for
several years. Don even took it to the field,
and if I remember correctly, and downloaded
data through a satellite link, to update some files
one time. SOTACA was used until 1990 when it
was replaced by others. Vince Roske and I have
often commiserated that the methodology un-
derlying SOTACA offered benefits for assessing
capabilities and forces that could profitably be
used nowadays.
While at SAIC, I became the first program
manager for Walt Hollis’s DUSA (OR) analytic
support contract for three years. Gene Visco
was the contract rep and we reacted to task or-
ders from the Army Staff and other agencies.
We executed about 60 or 70 task orders, about
$12.5 million worth of work. At that time, I
was a Division Manager at SAIC and had 15
people working for me. We were doing well
and then the Army decided, in all its wisdom,
to split the Hollis contract into three parts: a stra-
tegic part, an analytic part, and a human re-
sources/personnel part. Another part of SAIC
won the strategic part. We teamed with BDM
but lost the model part to Vector Research.
SAIC did not believe that it should build its
own independent model and there were some
issues with the leadership on the West Coast.
They didn’t think that modeling would be
around that long. That’s probably the wrong in-
terpretation but they did not want to invest the
money. It would take about $1 million to build
a model that you could effectively use to ad-
dress Army problems; they were already doing
a lot with the Air Force and the Navy and I don’t
think they wanted to invest that amount in
terms of Army. So we never built a model. I al-
ways thought that we should have had a bri-
gade-level model to be able to address some of
the issues that the Army was doing and help
us better work with some of the questions we
were getting asked.
For most of the work I was involved with at
SAIC, we acquired the right Army models to en-
sure credibility. We continued to execute task or-
ders either with the Army or the Marine Corps
the whole time I was there. We used VIC, went
through all the process of getting approval from
the Army to be able to use it, brought it up in
a classified environment, and used it to do elec-
tronic counter-measures work as part of the as-
sessment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
We did some assessment of several combat
models, but it was figuring out what the real
problem was and then figuring out what meth-
odologies were appropriate to attack them. We
generally argued, fairly successfully, that for an-
alytic task orders, they should be done in two
parts - an understanding part, leading to deter-
mination of methodology to solve it, and then
the actual modeling or assessment part.
I was promoted to Assistant Vice President
during part of that time. We worked on task or-
ders for CAA and other Army agencies, under
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Walt Hollis’s contract and others. The group I
was part of at SAIC did a lot of business with
the Army at Fort Belvoir for years.
I became heavily involved with the devel-
opment of the Army’s Close Combat Tactical
Trainer (CCTT). SAIC won the principal inte-
gration and developer role. CCTT was built by
Lockheed Martin and SAIC in Orlando, Florida.
I led a team that supported the programmers to
verify the operational tactics for both sides. I
wrote papers on the use of doctrine-based soft-
ware and gave a presentation on individual
combatants at MORS. The papers were entitled
‘‘Semi-automated forces (SAF) and Manned
Simulators Correlation Issues in CCTT’’ and
‘‘SAF Functional Analysis’’, both published
in the Proceedings of the 4th (and 6th) Conferences
on Computer Generated Forces and Behavioral
Representation. I later wrote a summary called
‘‘Expanding the Use of Doctrine-Based Soft-
ware’’ that was published in PHALANX Special
Report: Advanced Distributed Simulation (ADS)/
Distributed Interactive Simulation (DIS), Vol. 28,
No.3, Sept. 1995, by MORS.
CCTT completely immersed the crews in a
virtual environment and we (SAIC and my team
in particular) had to make sure that what they
saw out the window of the tank or Bradley
was consistent with Army doctrine. We worked
very closely with the software engineers so that
they understood what a company was, what
a battalion was, how they were organized, and
then how to display them. We went through a
verification process with the software engineers
after they produced the code. We sat down and
watched the screen and went through the drill
of determining whether or not it was an accu-
rate and credible display as the simulated units
changed formations, engaged, etc. I had a team
of about 10 people that were working on the So-
viet and Army sides.
SAIC teamed again with Lockheed Martin
and won a contract to develop a similar system
for the British Army. To even begin the process,
we had to understand British doctrine and tactics.
We hired a retired Brit officer who worked with
me for the better part of a year and a half as we
worked with the software engineers to ensure that
we were adequately displaying British tactics.
Later, my group supported the Marine
Corps Infantry Systems Group at Quantico,
and I became involved in developing value-
based models for evaluating how Marine infan-
try systems could be used effectively in a Marine
Expeditionary Force environment.
BOB SHELDON: Let’s back up to your ini-
tial involvement in MORS. When was your first
presentation in MORS?
BRIAN MCENANY: In 1971 at the Army
Operations Research Symposium (AORS) and
the same year at MORS.
BOB SHELDON: What was the topic of
your presentation?
BRIAN MCENANY: It had to do with the
Mark Twain System – how it was used to ana-
lyze the Army program; I later gave presenta-
tions in MORS while I was at the Joint Staff on
the NATO study. I participated in a theater war-
gaming study panel run by SRI that dealt with
a lot of modeling issues. I wrote a paper on force
analysis and rates of advance and made a pre-
sentation at MORS.
BOB SHELDON:What was your initial im-
pression of your first MORS Symposium?
BRIAN MCENANY: I was impressed with
the breadth of information presented. Over the
years I always tried to get the proceedings, but
in the earlier days, the publication was classified
with a limited distribution. All that great infor-
mation was locked in a safe when it could be
used profitably by analysts to help structure
their studies and assessments. It wasn’t until
they started setting up the programs where they
would have the presentations being released
early enough so that they could put them into
an unclassified publication and then ultimately
on a CD, that you would have the ability to take
away the things that you’d seen at MORS. Pro-
fessionally, that is most important. If you want
to know how a good study is run, and that study
had been awarded the Rist Prize or the Barchi
Prize, then you ought to be able to take that back
with you to use it as a reference. Those last two
are published in the MOR Journal which should
be on every analyst’s bookshelf.
I am a strong supporter of the MOR Journal.
But I think the Journal has gotten too academic.
When I was the President, we tried right at the
beginning to ensure that the applied practical
studies were at least half of it, and now mostly
it’s theoretic. I’d like to see more applied work
where you didn’t have to wade through so
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . MR. BRIAN R. MCENANY
Military Operations Research, V15 N3 2010 Page 105
many epsilons and theoretic discussions. OR is
quantitative, but the applied aspects to me were
always the most important - how did someone
or a team address a problem that faced the
DoD?
My first introduction to the OR community
came at the AORS at the Army Logistics Man-
agement Center (ALMC) in 1971. We were in
a big room and I was really looking forward to
hearing the DUSA (OR), who at that time was
Wilbur Payne. You couldn’t see him in the room
until he was introduced. After his introduction,
it looked like this janitor stood up in the back of
the room and walked up to the podium, There
was Wilbur Payne, sleeves rolled up, his tie
pulled down .and he gave a very good talk
about OR. He was often unkempt – I remember
when I was working in PAE when he was the
DUSA (OR). He used to come into one of the
military assistant’s offices and lie down on his
couch to take a nap. There are many stories
about Wilbur Payne and I won’t add to them
at this point.
When I was at SAGA, I became involved
with the establishment of Working Group
(WG) 12. It later became WG-14, Joint Opera-
tions. We pushed to have the Joint Staff act as
the sponsor for the working group through the
MORS BoD.
I was asked to serve on the MORS BoD in
1990. My first assignment was to serve on the
Prize Committee, and I found out I really
enjoyed reviewing papers. The second year, I
asked to become Chairman of the Prize Com-
mittee. I also started pulling a lot of the initial
data together from the Services to support the
early Careers in MORS pamphlet. My third year
I was elected as the Vice President for Profes-
sional Affairs (VPPA), and in 1994 at the Air
Force Academy I was elected President. Greg
Parnell, FS, was my immediate predecessor
and Chris Fossett, FS, took over from me.
BILL DUNN: You had a really star-studded
Executive Council while you were President.
BRIANMCENANY: I did. Chris Fossett, FS,
Jackie Henningsen, FS, Brian Engler, and Pris-
cilla Glasow, FS, all of which had served as offi-
cers, secretaries, and treasurers. Jackie was the
Vice President (VP) for Meetings Ops and had
worked hard to restructure the composite
groups before I was President. Chris was VPPA,
Priscilla was the Treasurer, and Brian Engler
was the VP for Admin and the financial side.
He worked with Dick Wiles, FS on the business
management of MORS. An excellent staff and
there wasn’t too much that happened that one
of us didn’t know what to do. We listened to
what Dick Wiles told us and then we’d do it.
BOB SHELDON: So you more or less
trusted Dick’s advice when you were President?
BRIAN MCENANY: There was guidance I
got from Greg Parnell, E. B. Vandiver, and others
that said ‘‘Listen to what Dick Wiles tells you.’’
BILL DUNN: Plus he was artillery too.
BRIANMCENANY:He was, but there were
times when Dick and I had different views, so
we would sit down and negotiate. He had very
strong views of how the Society ought to ad-
dress certain things and usually you could go
along with that approach because the MORS
staff was doing all the work–you sort of monitor
the things that go through.
The hardest thing for MORS to do is the spe-
cial meetings. You need to get the topics down,
and get the administrative processing to a point
where Natalie and the staff could start looking
for sites, getting a time, and getting the sponsors
to agree to it. But that’s something that MORS of-
fers to the defense community that is very impor-
tant–to be able to address cogent and classified
meetings. What MORS did not do as well, was
to be able to get the results from the meetings
quickly out to the members who participated.
That has changed for the better over the years.
We had some interesting special meetings.
We had the first special meeting for the Joint
Staff, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
(JROC) special meeting; ADM Bill Owens, the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Staff at that time,
came over. The Joint Staff came in and said
‘‘We need to have a meeting now,’’ and MORS
reacted and was able to find a site, find a place
to hold it, and get the administrative parts taken
care of so that they could have the special meet-
ing. It all took place in a very compressed time
frame. We got the Terms of Reference (TOR) ap-
proved and it came off very well. Jackie Hen-
ningsen handled a lot of it. It was one of the
fastest meetings set up by the MORS staff - the
council threw themselves into planning and
within two months, it kicked off. There was
a great response from JCS and the community.
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During the period that I was on the BoD,
MORS began to push for the establishment of
a professional journal. Several Presidents and
their staffs contributed to its launching. COL
Jimmy Kays, head of Systems Engineering and
one of my classmates from West Point, pushed
it through the BoD while I was the VPPA. The
MORS committees then had to establish edito-
rial policies, when would we do it, how do we
get it funded, how do we get approval from
the sponsors. It took the better part of 1 ½ years
to work its way through the process. Peter Per-
due from the NPS was the first editor. Part of
the time we addressed how do you get studies?
And then if they don’t meet the criteria that we
set up, how do you referee them? Finally we got
to the point where the first edition was ready to
be published. Success has a thousand fathers -
and work on the Journal took the concentrated
efforts of three Presidents at least. I can state that
the first edition was published right after I be-
came President.
I found my tenure as VPPA to be very re-
warding. Priscilla Glasow and the late Sue
Iwanski, FS pushed through changes in how
the Barchi and Rist prizes were reviewed. Mark
Youngren’s handbook was started as well as
Peter Perdue and the MOR Journal mentioned
above.
During the later part of my tenure on the
BoD, the structure of MORS was being changed.
It was a function of changes that the govern-
ment was making in how ethics regulations
were being interpreted for government person-
nel. Over a three- or four-year period, through
the time I was President, MORS was subjected
to more and more limitations being placed on
government personnel. After serving his full
term on the BoD, Mike Bauman, FS chose not
to extend due to the uncertainty that was raised
by the Government about potential conflicts of
interest and ethics issues. He did not want to ap-
pear to be promoting the interests of MORS
while serving both as a MORS BoD Officer
and as Director, TRAC. He thought he could
do just as much for MORS as Director, TRAC
as he could by being a BoD Officer.
Harry Thie, FS spent a considerable amount
of time heading the Governance Committee try-
ing to figure out how MORS would adjust to
this. We wanted to ensure that MORS could
operate in an environment where government
personnel, up through senior level, could par-
ticipate in the program and not be in violation
of the government ethics rules. Waivers were
attempted, but the legal counsels for the Army
and Navy didn’t buy it.
Harry Thie presented the BoD with a way of
separating the functions that MORS was cur-
rently performing. It created a shield so that
the government people would not be placed in
a position of being directly responsible for fi-
nancial decisions, e.g., salaries, what the fee
structure would be for the next symposium,
the handling of contracts, etc. This was all being
proposed to the BoD, and Harry then produced
the by-laws changes amendment to the MORS
Charter. One of the last things that I did in June
1995 was to get the Board to approve all the
changes that split MORS into two chunks – the
administrative side and the professional side.
At that time we believed that was the way to
protect the government personnel. They could
still participate and not be subjected to being
in a conflict of interest. Most of the meetings
were devoted to this. The whole time I was Pres-
ident, that was the number one issue in the min-
utes. Chris Fossett, who took over after me, had
the responsibility for implementing the changes
that took place.
BOB SHELDON: It wasn’t quite settled
when I was on the Board.
BRIAN MCENANY: It took a while - it
started in 1992 when the government began
making the changes as to how to do it.
While I was President, SAIC funded my at-
tendance at all the special meetings. I think I
was able to go to all of them that year - Albu-
querque, Carlisle, the JROC special meeting, as
well as the Air Force Academy and Naval Acad-
emy.
BOB SHELDON: Dick Wiles went to RPI
too. Did he overlap with you?
BRIAN MCENANY: I think he was there
both before (64-66) and after me (71-73).
My last function as President was at the Na-
val Academy for the 63rd MORSS. ADM Bill
Owens was the keynote speaker at Annapolis
when I was there, and we weren’t sure exactly
when he was going to arrive. You have a sched-
ule of things that you have to do when you are
running the membership meeting, and we’d
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already gone through the first part and were
waiting for him to show up.
Dick Wiles and I had a quick meeting and
we decided to start the ‘‘state of the society’’
briefing. Denny Baer, FS was standing on the
floor of the auditorium near the door where
Owens was supposed to come through. We
heard a helicopter come in and I still had about
10 or 12 slides to go through - so I kept talking.
Denny started waving at me, and I couldn’t tell
whether he was trying to get me to shorten it up
or stretch it out. But Owens finally walked in
and I stopped the briefing, flipped a page in
my notes, and went through his introduction.
He gave his speech and then left right after it.
It was interesting to go through the drill of try-
ing to get him in and out of the meeting that
day.
My role as Past President allowed me to at-
tend various functions and I was honored to be
elected a Fellow in 1999. I have tried to keep my
hand in the analysis business since then and I
find that I am drawn to the professional affairs
side of MORS mostly. I have attended three of
the Education Colloquiums and helped judge
the various teams working on problems.
I also was part of the MORS Advanced Dis-
tributive Simulation 1996 symposium at Wil-
liamsburg, Virginia. I participated with WG 4
on Training, Mission Rehearsal, and Alternative
Courses of Action. Out of that meeting came
a recommendation for a training WG to be
established at MORSS. Up to that time, MORS
had not done very much with the training com-
munity. There seemed to be a belief that you
build models for training and you build mod-
els to conduct analysis and assessments. The
two groups were completely different. Many
training models initially came from the flight
simulators and the tank gunnery communities.
Assessment/analysis is from the modeling side
of the house that we’re more familiar with.
BILL DUNN: The trainers deal more with
clock time and the analysis people try to acceler-
ate time.
BRIANMCENANY: Yes, that’s part of it. In
the old theater-level games, simulated airplanes
took off, flew over, dropped their bombs and
then scurried back to their bases because they
had to be there to be hit by the bombs falling
from the opposing side’s airplanes, – that’s the
slowly falling bomb theory. Real time was try-
ing to get Air Force time associated with Navy
time associated with Army time dealing with
days versus hours versus minutes, and it just
doesn’t work out in some areas.
I took as a personal responsibility for one of
the recommendations from the training group
and that was to establish a training group in
MORS. I went through the process of getting
a charter built and went to the BoD and up
through the committee system to get them to ap-
prove the analytic support for training. It took
a little more than a year to do it. I wrote up
a charter, discussed it with the committees and
answered questions from the BoD. It is now
WG 22 - Analytic Support to Training. I was
the chairman of that group for about three years
and then turned it over to another analyst.
Over the years, I have contributed to the
writing of some MORS publications. I still read
each issue of PHALANX and strongly support
the continuation of the MOR Journal.
BOB SHELDON: You also have a family
connection to the historical days at West Point?
BRIAN MCENANY: Yes, my great-great-
grandfather was a Sergeant in the engineer
company at West Point during that time. The ar-
tillery battery and engineer company stationed
at West Point ended up leaving before the war.
Winfield Scott, who was the General-in-Chief,
believed that when Lincoln was inaugurated,
they should have more regulars in Washington
because the Washington militias were predomi-
nantly Southern. You had government people
walking around with something called the
South Carolina Cockade on their suits. When
the war started, two of the militia companies
in Washington refused to take the oath of alle-
giance. The artillery from West Point became
Delta Battery of the US Fifth Artillery, which
even now is known as the West Point Battery.
[It was also the Battery commanded by Alexan-
der Hamilton during the Revolution.] It left the
Point in January of 1861 and the engineer com-
pany followed right after it. When they left, they
took all the horses with them. There was no cav-
alry training at West Point until the next year.
The artillery battery was positioned on Pennsyl-
vania Avenue along the route to the Capitol, and
the engineer company was part of Lincoln’s se-
curity contingent.
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Later, the engineer company became part of
the US Engineer battalion and was assigned to
the Army of the Potomac’s engineer brigade.
My great-great-grandfather stayed at West
Point and was the First Sergeant of the enlisted
detachment left behind to help train the cadets.
BOB SHELDON: Your hobby is historical
research and I know you’re researching a book.
Talk a little bit about your historical research.
BRIANMCENANY:We don’t have enough
time [Laughter]. I’m writing a book about the
West Point Class of 1862, and the reason is it’s
the class that graduated 100 years before my
class at West Point. There are similarities be-
tween my class and this class: both classes grad-
uated in the midst of a war or about to go into
a war; all of us were second and third officers
in various units - some of my classmates served
multiple times, while the Civil War officers
served for the duration; and both classes had
Medal of Honor winners.
Mary Elizabeth Sergent, a Civil War histo-
rian, used to baby sit me when I was about three
or four years old. She lived next door to some
friends of my folks. In 1958, Mary Betty was in
the midst of writing a book about the class of
1861; there were two classes that graduated that
year – a May class and a June class – and she
would come to the West Point library to research
those classes. When I was a plebe she showed
up one Saturday morning and said ‘‘How’d
you like to go out to dinner?’’ She had a picture
of me when I was about three years old. We had
a very long relationship. I became one of her
adopted nephews, of which there were 14 or
15 by the time she passed away. My two room-
mates became the other two nephews, and ev-
ery four years, she had a new set of nephews
in a different class. If you went through the West
Point cemetery with her, she would tell you the
life history of those in the Civil War as we
passed the various tombstones that are there.
It got me interested in looking at Civil War his-
tory. Subsequently, she gave lectures to the His-
tory Department at West Point, and to various
Civil War Round Tables. She died in Middle-
town, NY, in 2005.
In 2002, I convinced the class officers in my
class that we ought to know something about
the class that graduated 100 years before ours.
I gave about a 15-minute presentation at our
40th reunion. Mary Betty Sergent and I wrote
a 25-page abbreviated history that was a class
handout at the reunion. After the reunion, I
got very interested in continuing the research.
There seemed to be enough information to war-
rant pulling together a book. My OR back-
ground has proven useful - simple graphs on
timelines allows one to determine who was
present at the same time - then search for official
records and manuscripts that discuss that pe-
riod. The hardest part has been trying to pin
down what units the class were part of during
the war.
The first part of the book about their West
Point years is basically done. The second part -
their Civil War contributions - is still under edit
and review. The book will have 13 chapters in
it; I have written all except the last one - an epi-
logue - that still needs to be pulled together.
E.B. Vandiver is helping me edit the battle chap-
ters. I sent Part One to Hal Nelson, the ex-Chief
of Military History, and one to West Point to have
them look at the West Point years. Hopefully in
2009, I will have the manuscript completed and
I can find a publisher. That’s my goal.
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